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A Malpractice-Based Duty to Disclose the
Risk of Stillbirth: A Response to Lens
Nadia N. Sawicki`
ABSTRACT:

In Medical Paternalism,

Stillbirth,

& Blindsided

Mothers, Lens argues that physicians who fail to disclose the risk of stillbirth
to pregnantpatients should be liable under the doctrine of informed consent.
In this Response, I suggest that courts might be hesitant to expand informed

consent in the way Lens proposes. Instead, I offer an alternative avenuefor
imposing liability, via traditionaltheories of medical malpractice.
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The claim that Jill Wieber Lens makes in her article, Medical Paternalism,
Stillbirth, & Blindsided Mothers,1 is unassailable: physicians should have a legal
duty to disclose the risk of stillbirth to pregnant patients. It will likely come as
a surprise to many readers to learn that neither law nor medical practice
currently recognize such a duty.
For those with no personal or professional experience with stillbirth, the
information Lens shares will be shocking. In the United States, a country with
one of the most advanced health care systems in the world, "[o]ne in
16o pregnancies will end in stillbirth" annually, leading to "at least 24,000"

Georgia Reithal Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Beazley Institute for Health Law
and Policy, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.

1. Jill Wieber Lens, Medical Paternalism, Stillbirth, & Blindsided Mothers, io6 IowA L. REV.
665 (2021).
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stillbirths per year.2 When an unborn child dies in the womb after 20 weeks
of pregnancy, the parents suffer not only the loss of a desired child at an
advanced stage of fetal development, but other traumas as well. As Lens points
out, "the most traumatic experience in childbirth," and one that is not widely
recognized, is "giving birth to a dead baby."3 When a baby is stillborn, the
physician will tell the parent "that she still needs to give birth to her child the
same as if he were alive . ... After delivery, she will hold her baby in her arms
if she desires as she makes plans for the disposition of his body."4
While stillbirth is not always preventable, there are many steps that can
be taken to reduce its risk; as Lens points out, several other countries have
successfully led campaigns that have achieved this goal.5 But the United States
lags behind in this regard, in large part because health care providers do not
share this information with pregnant patients. Patients are very well-informed
about some pregnancy-related risks, including miscarriage, genetic
abnormalities, and sudden infant death syndrome. 6 Moreover, patients are
routinely reminded by their physicians (and even strangers) of the risks
associated with smoking, drug use, alcohol consumption, cold cuts, sushi, and
unpasteurized cheese during pregnancy.7 But most people experiencing
pregnancy are, in Lens' words, "ignorant" of the risk that their unborn child
might die in the later stages of pregnancy.8 Physicians routinely fail to engage
pregnant patients in meaningful conversation about the risk of stillbirth, and
patients are "blindsid[ed]" when they suffer this loss.9 The fact that stillbirth
is not culturally recognized as a traumatic loss, and that the suffering is silent,
only contributes to this indignity.Lens' work on this topic offers valuable contributions to so many areas of
scholarly discussion. Her article addresses (among other things) how feminist

2.
3.
4.

Id. at 669.
Id. at 668.
Id.

5.

Id. at 675-77

6.
7.

Id. at 673-74
Anne Drapkin Lyerly, Lisa M. Mitchell, Elizabeth Mitchell Armstrong, Lisa H. Harris,

Rebecca Kukla, Miriam Kuppermann & Margaret Olivia Little, Risk and the Pregnant Body,
39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34, 34, 38 (2009) (arguing that "advice given to pregnant women on how
to stay healthy in everyday life . .
reflects fear, not evidence," citing admonishments that
"pregnant women ... avoid an array of foods from soft cheese to sushi, to sleep in a specified
position (currently, avoiding stomach and back, with left side preferred to right), to avoid paint
(including those with low volatile compounds), to avoid changing the cat litter, not to sit in the
bathtub longer than ten minutes, not to sample the cookie dough, to avoid loud music, and even
to keep a laptop computer several inches from their pregnant bellies, 'just in case."'). See generally
Michele Goodwin, Prosecutingthe Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1657 (2008) (engaging difficult
questions related to fetal disability, maternal responsibility, drug use, and state response); LINDA
C. FENTIMAN, BLAMING MOIIERS: AMERICAN LAW ANI) 1TIE RISKS t0

(same).
8.

9.
10.

Lens, supra note

Jd. at 672.
Id. at 675.

1,

at 667.
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perspectives on decision-making can inform law and medical practice," the
need for medicine to value information-sharing by patients with intimate
knowledge of their own bodies,12 and tort law's crucial role in discovering and
exposing information that is hidden from public view.'. However, the crux of
Lens' argument focuses on the tort doctrine of informed consent, and how it
ought to play a stronger role in recognizing and enforcing health care
providers' duties to inform patients about the risk of stillbirth.'4
In order to ground her argument, Lens first does the thankless work of
identifying and dismantling the reasons why "doctors remain steadfast that
women don't need to and shouldn't know of the risk of stillbirth."1 These
reasons are based on false assumptions about the preventability of stillbirth,
misconceptions about what kind of information is "material" in informed
consent cases, as well as harmful stereotypes about women's emotional and
decision-making capacity.' 6 Lens successfully rebuts each of these points,
making a compelling case that information about the risk of stillbirth (and
the steps that can be taken to reduce that risk) is not only "material," but
essentialfor patients experiencing pregnancy.'7 She also effectively challenges
two other arguments about why tort claims might be inappropriate in the
context of stillbirth, dealing with the issues of causation,' and damages.'
I am deeply sympathetic to Lens' position. Having written extensively on
issues related to informed consent,2' I recognize the flexibility and nuance

11.
See generally Jamie R. Abrams, The Illusion of Autonomy in Women's Medical Decision-Making,
42 FIA. Si. U. L. REv. 17 (2014) (arguing that women's autonomy in reproductive decision
-making is illusory as a result of deference to medical judgment and subordination of women's
interests to those of the fetus).
i 2. See, e.g., Justin Jagosh, Joseph Donald Boudreau, Yvonne Steinert, Mary Ellen
MacDonald & Lois Ingram, The Importance of Physician Listening from the Patients' Perspective:
EnhancingDiagnosis, Healing, and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 85 PA'IILN'F EDUC. & CLNS[ 'LING
369, 371 (2011) (discussing the importance of listening to patients' "knowledge of their own
bodies and state of health" as part of the process of diagnosis and treatment selection).
13.
See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making:
Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in Light of Lessons from (un-Industy and Clerg-Sexual Abuse
Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1838 (2008) (discussing tort litigation's role in "generating
policy-relevant information" and "placing issues on the agendas of policy-making institutions").
14.
Lens, supra note 1, at 677-85.

15.

Id. at 686.

16.

Id. at 687-90.

17.

Id. at 686-99.

Jd. at 699-714.
Id. at 71 4
20.
See, e.g., Nadia N. Sawicki, Tort Law Implications of Compelled Physician Speech, 97 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=3868353 [https://
dx.doi.org/ 10.2139/ssrn.3868353]; Nadia N. Sawicki, Defining the Known Risk: Context-Sensitivity
in Tort Law Defenses, 12 J. TORT L. 9 (2o1 g); Valerie Gutmann Koch & Nadia N. Sawicki, Evetything
19.

.

18.

in Moderation: Dual Role Consent and State Law Mandates,

Sawicki, Choosing Medical Malpro ice, 93

1q AM.

J. BIOETHICS 35 (201 9); Nadia N.

L. REV. 891 (2018); Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed
Consent as Compelled Profpssional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
11 (2016); Nadia N. Sawicki, Infnmed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient Encounter: Tort Law
WAsii.

Implica/ions of Extra-Clinical Decision Support Tools, 21 ANNALS HKAI:II L. 1 (2012); Nadia N.
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inherent in this doctrine, and myself have argued for expanding the scope of
disclosure beyond what common law has already established.21 Lens'
argument for expanding the doctrine of informed consent, notably, rests on
an important foundational claim about the context in which informed consent
duties arise-and it is this claim that I wish to explore further.
As Lens notes, duties of disclosure in the traditional informed consent
context arose when patients faced decisions about medical interventions that
implicated bodily autonomy and therefore required affirmative consent.22 In
the absence of medical treatment involving bodily contact, physicians had no
need to secure consent, and therefore no duty to provide patients with
relevant information. Lens, however, argues that the duty to provide patients
with risk information-and the corresponding legal claim for breach of
informed consent-should extend throughout the course of pregnancy, even
when no specific medical procedure is at issue.23
In this Response, I suggest an alternative mechanism for imposing
liability on health care providers who fail to counsel pregnant patients about
stillbirth-the traditional doctrine of medical malpractice. Lens makes a bold
(and admirable) move in arguing that the informed consent cause of action
may be an appropriate remedy for non-disclosure of important risk
information during pregnancy. My concern is that courts are likely to resist
Lens' claim because it pushes the boundaries of informed consent
jurisprudence beyond the context of specific medical interventions. Instead,
I suggest that perhaps one need look no further than medical malpractice law
to achieve Lens' goals. My proposal is certainly less ground-breaking than
Lens' from a doctrinal perspective, but its relative simplicity may be more
effective in facilitating these needed developments.

Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less leat, 2 I CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
I (2011).

RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen

&

&

21.
See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Societal Stewardship, 45 J.L., MI).
ETHICS 41 (2017) (considering whether informing patients about the impact of their health
decisions on others is an effective way of balancing physician's ethical commitments to both
justice and patient autonomy); Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the
Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821 (arguing for expanding the scope of informed
consent disclosure to include non-medical information within a physician's knowledge and
expertise, where the information would be material to the reasonable patient, and its disclosure
does not violate public policy); Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based
Limitations on Medical Practice, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 85 (2016) (arguing that imposing a statutory
duty to disclose conscience-based limitations on treatment and access to information would be
consistent with common law principles of fiduciary duty and informed consent); Nadia N.
Sawicki, A Common Law Duty to Disclose Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical Practice, in LAW,

Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017) (arguing that the common law doctrine of informed consent is
broad enough to encompass a physician's duty to disclose conscience-based limitations on
medical practice).
22. Lens, supra note 1, at 677-85Jd. at 686 (positing that "[t]he application of informed consent doctrine to disclosure
23.
of stillbirth is novel, but not difficult," and arguing that such a move is necessary to encourage
the medical profession to disclose the risk of stillbirth).
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LIABILITY AND PHYSICIAN COMMUNICATION

In a foundational article about the First Amendment implications of

compelled physician speech, Robert Post writes:
The practice of medicine, like all human behavior, transpires
through the medium of speech. In regulating the practice,
therefore, the state must necessarily also regulate professional
speech. Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors
are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing
to speak. Doctors commit malpractice for failing to inform patients
in a timely way of an accurate diagnosis, for failing to give patients
proper instructions, for failing to ask patients necessary questions,
or for failing to refer a patient to an appropriate specialist. In all
these contexts the regulation of professional speech is theoretically
and practically inseparable from the regulation of medicine. 21
Just recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that states have the
constitutional authority to "regulate professional conduct, even though that
conduct [that] incidentally involves speech,"25 and acknowledged that
"drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult."2s Indeed,
recent First Amendment cases challenging speech prohibitions and mandates
in the context of medical practice reinforce how difficult it is to assess when a
health care provider's speech is not merely speech, but rather professional
conduct.`
While these First Amendment issues are not directly relevant to Lens'
argument, I believe they can inform it. As Post notes, medical practice is
inseparable from speech.28 When doctors obtain patient histories, they ask
pointed questions. When they make diagnoses, they communicate those
diagnoses to patients. When they prescribe medications, they rely on more
than just their prescription pads. When patients are hospitalized, doctors

24.

Robert Post, Inf rmed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled Physician

Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv.

25.

939,

950-51 (footnotes omitted).

Nat'l Inst. of Fain. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (enjoining

California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to make certain disclosures as a content-based
regulation of speech).

26.

Id. at 2373

27. For example, several cases challenging bans on sexual orientation conversion therapy
have addressed this distinction. See generally Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014),
abrogaled by Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (upholding
California ban on sexual orientation conversion therapy for children, under rational basis review,
as a regulation of conduct rather than speech); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir.
2014), abrogated by Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)
(upholding New Jersey ban on sexual orientation conversion therapy under intermediate
scrutiny, but finding that this type of therapy constitutes "speech" for the purposes of the First
Amendment); Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854 (11 th Cir. 2020) (finding that ban on
sexual orientation change therapy was an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech
subject to strict scrutiny, rather than "incidental speech swept up in the regulation of professional
conduct").
28. Post, supra note 24, at 949.
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speak with patients' family members to discuss goals of care and discharge
planning. Every point in the process of medical care involves speech. I offer
this introduction to demonstrate that, just as physician speech may be
considered conduct for First Amendment purposes, such speech may also be
grounds for malpractice liability when viewed from the perspective of tort law.
It may be tempting to view every situation where a physician
communicates risk information to a patient as one involving "informed
consent." But a closer look at the history and operation of informed consent
reinforces the fact that information and consent are two separate elements.
Physicians certainly have duties to provide information as part of the process
of securing a patient's consent to treatment-but as I demonstrate below,
their duties to communicate information to patients are actually much
broader, and implicate different legal principles. When physicians breach
their duty to disclose outside the context of securing consent to a specific
medical intervention, their liability is grounded not in the doctrine of
informed consent, but in traditional medical malpractice.
II.

ORIGINS OF INFORMED CONSENT

To understand the move that Lens is trying to make-expanding
informed consent duties to include disclosures to pregnant patients regarding
the risk of stillbirth-it is important, as Lens recognizes,9 to understand the
origins of informed consent liability. Historically, physicians routinely
withheld diagnostic information from patients, made treatment decisions
without consulting their patients, and even performed major medical
procedures without the patient's knowledge or consent.,0 It was not until the
late 196os that U.S. courts began to acknowledge that physicians owed
patients a responsibility not only to secure their consent to treatment, but to
ensure that the patients were well-informed enough to grant meaningful
consent.3>
Today, what we refer to as an "informed consent claim" is essentially a
claim for a very specific type of medical negligence. The claim rests on an
allegation that a physician breached their duty-a duty ostensibly established
by professional custom-to provide the plaintiff with sufficient information
to make an autonomous and informed decision about whether to consent to

1, at 677-85.

29.

See Lens, supra note

30.

RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT

6o (1986) (demonstrating that historical medical practices were grounded in principles of

&

benefice, that patient "autonomy figured insignificantly or not at all in reflections about
disclosure" and that any "consent practices emerging from this context were not meaning/li
exercises of autonomous derisionmaking"); JESSICA W. BERG, PAUL1 S. APPEIKBAUM, CI IARIES W. LIIz
LISA S. PARKER, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL TIIEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 42 (2d ed. 2001)

("Early medical practice codes did not speak of consent-it was more likely that a physician would
conceal his actions from the patient than seek his or her consent to treatment.");JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORILD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENF 1 (1984) (arguing "that disclosure and consent, except
in the most rudimentary fashion, [were] obligations alien to medical thinking and practice").

31. Sawicki, Modernizing Jnfrmed Consent: Expandingthe Boundaries of Materiality, supranote
21, at 827.
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a proposed medical treatment.3 2 A claim that a defendant physician breached
the duty to secure a patient's informed consent now stands as an independent
cause of action, separate and apart from traditional medical malpractice.33
Informed consent claims deal with breaches of a duty to provide information
in the context of securing a patient's consent to treatment, while medical
malpractice claims generally deal with all other breaches, including the duty
to make accurate diagnoses, select appropriate treatments, and perform those
treatments competently.34
As a historical matter, the first court cases establishing the doctrine we
currently recognize as "informed consent" involved intentional tort claims.
Patients whose physicians performed medical interventions without consent
were able to bring claims under the traditional common law doctrine of
battery-unconsented-to physical contact causing harm or offense.35 Under
the historical battery-based standard of informed consent, the physician's only
duty was to ensure that they had permission to perform a procedure on the
patient's body.
However, once the practice of securing consent to medical interventions
was well-established, patients began to express concerns not about the absence
of consent, but about the quality of consent. Even when physicians secured
patients' affirmative consent to medical treatment, they often failed to
provide information about risks and benefits that would give the patient the
knowledge to make an informed decision. Because these situations did not
constitute intentional torts-after all, consent was obtained, and it was not
obtained through fraud or duress-courts shifted their understanding of
informed consent from a battery-based standard to the current negligence
-based standard.36
The one unifying theme across both battery-based and negligence-based
doctrines is that they are tied to a patient's decision about whether or not to

32. Notably, at the time the negligence-based informed consent standard developed,
disclosure of risk information was not, in fact, a matter of professional custom. In this way, the
law of informed consent and the medical practice of informed consent arose hand-in-hand, with
law arguably leading the way. See Nadia N. Sawicki, E thial Malpractice, 58 HoUs. L. REV. at
*22-23 (forthcoming 2021), https://privpapers.ssrn.com/s013/papers.cfmabstractid=
3868348 [https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3868348].
See id. at *11 ("Although an informed consent violation could be viewed simply as a
33.
claim for medical malpractice-a breach of the medical standard of care, specifically with respect
to disclosure and communication with patients-courts chose to view informed consent claims
as distinct from traditional medical malpractice claims. As a procedural result, lawsuits brought
by patients against physicians include separate causes of action for malpractice and informed
consent.").

34.
35.

d. at *8.

See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905), overruled in pail by Genzel v.
Halvorson, 8o N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957) (holding that defendant physician who operated on
the plaintiff's left ear, when the plaintiff had consented to an operation only on the right ear,
committed an assault and battery); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914), abrogaled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that "a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages").
36.
See BERG IAI.,
T supra note 30, at 41-44.
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consent to a particular medical intervention. The duty to disclose is not a duty
"in the air," so to speak, but rather triggered by a patient's need to make a
decision about a medical intervention that requires affirmative consent. In
accordance with the doctrine's origins in the realm of intentional torts,
medical interventions requiring consent were those that involved physical
contact, like surgery. Indeed, some jurisdictions still limit informed consent
liability to surgical contexts and others involving serious physical invasion.7
However, most jurisdictions have extended the common law duty to secure
informed consent to contexts involving a broader scope of active medical
interventions, regardless of the extent to which they involve serious physical
invasion-for example, prescribing medication, administering vaccines, and
setting broken bones.38
This history poses a challenge to Lens' argument that patients who are
not informed about the risk of stillbirth could pursue an informed consent
cause of action. Because general risk information shared by physicians during
the course of routine pregnancy management is not tied to a decision about
a particular medical procedure or intervention requiring consent, courts
considering stillbirth-related disclosure claims are likely to resist viewing them
from the perspective of informed consent. However, as I explain in Part III,
that would not negate the existence of the disclosure duty proposed by Lens
-rather, it would situate the duty squarely within the context of traditional
medical malpractice.
III. DISTINGUISHING INFORMED CONSENT AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Although informed consent actions and medical malpractice actions are
both grounded in claims that a physician breached a duty of care, courts treat
them as independent claims for pleading purposes. While it is tempting to
differentiate the two by categorizing all breaches of disclosure duties as
informed consent claims, and breaches of all other standards of practice as
malpractice claims, this distinction does not hold.39 As explained in Part II,
not every breach of a disclosure duty is connected to a medical procedure
requiring affirmative consent. Informed consent law arose from consent to
specific bodily interventions, to ensure that bodily interests were not harmed.

37. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent:Expanding the Boundaies of Maleriality, supranote
21, at 832 n.46 (citing a range of cases in which courts "narrowed the disclosure duty even
further, limiting the types of procedures for which informed consent is required").
38.

Id. at 832.

39.
There are also other important differences between the two claims, including in their
requirements for proving causation in fact and proximate causation. BERG ET AL., supranote 30,
at 136-40 (discussing differences in the causation requirements for malpractice and informed
consent cases). To prove factual causation in informed consent cases, a plaintiff must prove that
if the defendant had made the required disclosures, a reasonably prudent patient would have
chosen an alternate course of treatment, and therefore the injury would not have occurred
(commonly referred to as "decision-causation"). Id. at 138-40. To prove proximate causation in
informed consent cases, the plaintiff must prove that the injury they suffered was a manifestation
of the risk the physician failed to disclose (commonly referred to as "injury-causation"). Id. at

137-38.
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In contexts where there is no decision to be made about an active medical
intervention, duties of disclosure do not fall clearly within the scope of
informed consent doctrine. Rather, breaches of general disclosure duties are
best understood as examples of traditional medical malpractice.
In her article, Lens cites several pregnancy-related cases to support the
claim that informed consent doctrine can (and should) expand to contexts
where "[n]o progressive and threatening disease drives the patient to
undergo medical treatment."41 But a closer look at these cases suggests that
courts still recognize meaningful differences between liability based on non
-disclosure in the context of active decision-making about proposed medical
interventions, and liability based on non-disclosures in other contexts.
Many of the cases Lens cites are wrongful birth cases, in which parents
claim that a health care provider's failure to provide information about
prenatal genetic testing or prenatal risk factors should entitle them to tort
recovery. Wrongful birth cases are fundamentally about the loss of
opportunity to make an informed medical decision-the decision about
whether to proceed with a pregnancy or terminate it. While termination of
pregnancy is, of course, a medical procedure that would require affirmative
consent, wrongful birth cases differ significantly from traditional informed
consent actions. A standard informed consent claim would be one where the
physician and patient discuss termination of pregnancy as an option, but the
physician fails to disclose relevant risk information about that procedure or
its alternatives. In wrongful birth cases, in contrast, the patient is deprived of
the opportunity to even consider termination as an option, as a result of the
physician's negligence in sharing information about the pregnancy. From my
perspective, it is because of this important distinction that courts view
wrongful birth claims from the perspective of traditional medical malpractice,
rather than as informed consent claims.4
In one of the cases discussed in Lens' article, for example, the Supreme
Court of Kansas cited a treatise42 describing "[t]he problem of malpractice
liability based upon the physician's failure to inform his patient of an
unfavorable diagnosis or test" as being "similar in many respects to these

40.
See Lens, supra note i, at 681 (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent
to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 264 (1985)). Note that Schultz's
discussion of patient's informational rights relates not to situations where no medical treatment
is being considered, but rather where patients are consenting to "procedures [that] are, to a
significant degree, optional." Id.
41.
See generally Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assocs., Inc., 844 N.E.2d
116o (Ohio 2006) (analyzing a claim for negligent genetic testing and counseling as a medical
negligence claim where the injury is the deprivation of an opportunity for informed decision
-making). See alsoAzzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 580, 585 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in
pari ,rev'd in par, 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1984) (in a case based on a physician's failure to inform
a patient of the availability of genetic counseling and explain the risk that her child might have
genetic defects, analyzing it in terms of "negligent violation of the accepted standard of care in
the community in which he practiced," and noting that "the cause of action for wrongful birth
fits comfortably within the traditional tort framework and contains the required elements for a
negligence action-duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages").
42.
Nold ex reL Noldv. Binyon, 31 P. 3 d 274, 286 (Kan. 2001).
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'informed consent' cases."4 The litigation at issue arose from health care
providers' failure to disclose a positive test result to a pregnant woman who
was an asymptomatic carrier of Hepatitis B.44 While recognizing similarities
between informed consent claims and malpractice claims for failure to inform
a patient of test results, the court ultimately viewed the patient's claim as a
type of medical malpractice claim.45 The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed
with the district court's conclusion that "[w] here a communicable disease has
been diagnosed in a pregnant woman ...
the woman's physician has an
obligation as a matter of law to inform the woman of the diagnosis."4 6
In another wrongful birth case discussed in the article, an appellate court
explicitly distinguished between these two forms of liability and rejected the
informed consent claim, though on different grounds.47 Canesi ex rel. Canesi v.
Wilson was brought by a mother who gave birth to a child with a congenital
defect; she claimed that her physicians had prescribed medication without
disclosing that it could cause such a defect.48 She brought an informed
consent claim as well as a wrongful birth claim, seeking recovery for emotional
harms as well as medical expenses associated with raising a child with a
disability.49 In describing the difference between the two claims, the court
highlighted their distinct standards of causation. For the informed consent
claim to succeed, the plaintiff would have to prove that her child's injury was
actually caused by the medication risk the doctor failed to disclose;5° but
because she had not done so, her informed consent claim was dismissed.5'
The wrongful birth claim, on the other hand, only required proof that the
mother's awareness of the undisclosed risk would have caused her to
terminate the pregnancy-regardless of whether the undisclosed risk actually
manifested itselfms Although both claims were grounded in the same set of

43. Jack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Malpractice: Failure of Physician to Notify Patient of
Unfavorable Diagnosis or Test, 49 A.L.R.3d 501 § 2 [a] (i973).
44.
45.

Nold, 31 P. 3 d at 2 7 8-81.

See id. at 277, 285.

46.
Id. at 286. While the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed and remanded based on several
errors made by the district court, at no point did it frame this case as anything other than a
traditional medical malpractice case.
See generally Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 73o A.2d 805 (NJ. 1999) (discussing
47.
different forms of liability in wrongful birth cases).

48.
49.

Id. at 8og-io.
Jd. at 81 o.

50.
Id. at 812-13. This relates to the discussion in note 39, sufra, about the causation
standards in informed consent cases.
51.
"The record discloses that plaintiffs presented insufficient proof of a causal relationship
between the drug and the defect that afflicts their son.... Similarly, the evidence was insufficient
to establish medical causation in support of plaintiffs' additional allegation that Provera caused
the retention of a defective ovum, leading eventually to the birth of their child with the congenital
defect." Id. at 814.
52.
"The appropriate proximate cause question [in a wrongful birth claim], therefore, is
not whether the doctor's negligence caused the fetal defect; the congenital harm suffered by the
child is expressly not compensable. Rather, the determination to be made is whether the doctors'
inadequate disclosure deprived the parents of their deeply personal right to decide for
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facts regarding the physician's non-disclosure of risk information,53 the court
held that the facts presented could not sustain an informed consent claim.54
In supporting the expansion of informed consent obligations to the
context of pregnancy, even when no specific medical procedure is at issue,
Lens also cites a leading torts treatise.i In their discussion of informed
consent, the authors write that "the physician may be required to disclose
some information even if there is no immediate medical procedure to be
performed, specifically a diagnosis of or test result showing that the plaintiff has a
disease." 6 The treatise cites two cases in support of this proposition, but in
my view, neither are persuasive. The treatise first cites Nold, discussed above,
which held that a doctor's breach of the duty to inform a pregnant patient of
test results is a basis for a wrongful birth cause of action; as noted above, that
claim was analyzed under traditional negligence principles.37 The second case
cited, Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients &EFams. Comp. Fund, held that a
physician who has made a non-negligent diagnosis could nevertheless be
liable under Wisconsin's informed consent statute for failing to inform the
patient about other diagnostic tests that might be available.58 A dissenting
opinion in that case described this holding as inappropriately "expanding a
patient's right of informed consent."Y9 The dissenting judge described the
plurality opinion as creating "an entirely new concept" of liability that would
"require that whenever there is a claim that the correct diagnosis of a patient's
ailment was not made, a physician would be liable for failing to tell a patient
about all potential diagnoses and all potential tests that could have been
employed to evaluate whether different ailments were the source of the
patient's symptoms."6o The Jandreopinion has also been repeatedly criticized
by legal scholars for the same reasons.i

themselves whether to give birth to a child who could possibly be afflicted with a physical
abnormality." /d. at 818.

53. The court also used language familiar from the informed consent context in describing
the physician's general duty to disclose-as being "limited by what risks a reasonably prudent
patient in the plaintiffs position would consider material to her decision." Id. at 816.
54. It is important to acknowledge here that as envisioned by Lens, a stillbirth informed
consent claim would likely have no difficulty meeting the causation standards found lacking by
the court in Canesi. If a physician fails to disclose the risk of stillbirth associated with pregnancy,
and a stillbirth occurs, injury causation would likely be satisfied.
Lens, supra note i, at 681.
DAN B. DOBB, PAUi. T. HAYDEN & Ei
2021) (emphasis added).

55.

56.

57.

58.

EN M. BUBIiCK, Ti

IE LAW OF TORTS

§31o (2d ed.

Nold ex rel. Nold v. Binyon, 31 P. 3 d 274, 277 (Kan. 2001).
Jandre v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Wisc.

2012) (quoting Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 78-79 (1995)) (establishing a physician's
duty "to disclose to the patient the existence of any methods of diagnosis or treatment that would
serve as feasible alternatives to the method initially selected by the physician to diagnose or treat
the patient's illness or injury").

59.

Id. at 674 (Roggensack,J., dissenting).
Id. at 675 (Roggensack,J., dissenting).
61 . See, e.g., Michael Rohde, Comment, nformation Overload: Ihow the Wisconsin Supreme Cowl
Expanded the Doc/ine of Informed Consen, 46 J. MARSI lAiL L. Rvv. 1097, 1098, 1105 (2013)
6o.
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In my opinion, the limited case law on this issue does not support the
idea that failure to disclose medical information unrelated to a proposed
medical intervention could be the basis of an informed consent claim. Rather,
when considering alleged breaches of physicians' duties of disclosure, courts
actively distinguish between malpractice-based and informed consent-based
causes of action.
IV. DISCLOSURE DUTIES OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF INFORMED CONSENT

While it is true that providing a diagnosis is part of the scope of
traditional informed consent disclosures,2 the reason for this is so that a
patient can make an informed decision about whether to consent to a
treatment aimed at addressing that diagnosis. When no medical treatment is
being proposed, failures of disclosure that deprive patients of the opportunity
to know that they have been diagnosed with a disease, 63 or of the opportunity
to evaluate different diagnostic tests once they have already been diagnosed,64
are more appropriately understood to be grounded in traditional medical
malpractice principles.
Indeed, the duty of physicians to disclose information such as test results
and diagnoses outside the context of a conversation about whether to consent
to a specific medical intervention is well-understood to be part of the general
standard of care of what it means to be a reasonably competent health care
provider. Leading treatises on medical malpractice identify this general duty
and distinguish it from the duty to make disclosures in the context of securing
consent to treatment.6
One, for example, clarifies that while

&

(describing the Jandre decision as "misappl [ying] the informed consent doctrine, effectively
expanding the scope of a physician's duties to inform," and being an outlier where "other
jurisdictions have consistently found a physician's disclosure duties do not extend to conditions
outside the diagnosis"); Krista J. Sterken, Michael B. Van Sicklen & Norman Fost, Mandatory
Informed Consent Disclosures in the Diagnostic Context: Sometimes Less Is More, 17 N.Y.U. J. Lcis.
PITB. POL'Y 1o, 105-06 (2014) (arguing that there is no duty to disclose information about
excluded diagnoses or diagnostic tests, and that such a duty would "impose [1 impractical burdens
on the healthcare system" with minimal benefits); Marc D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent and the
Differential Diagnosis:How the Law Can Overestimate PatientAutonomy and Compromise1ealth Care, 6o
WAYNE L. REv. 349, 351 (2014) (criticizing the fact that "some jurisdictions have manipulated
informed consent" to include the process of differential diagnosis, and arguing that it is
"unnecessary expansion of the doctrine and potentially compromises health care").

62.

BARRY R. F TRROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUtS JOST

& ROIWRF L. SCIIwAR'z, HEAL :I LAW 125 ( 3 d ed. 2015).
63.
Nold ex rel. Nold v. Binyon, 31 P. 3 d 274, 286 (Kan. 2001).
64.
Jandre, 813 N.W.2d at 675 (Roggensack,J., dissenting).
65.
See, e.g., Gregory G. Sarno, Physician'sFailure to Disclose Diagnosis or Test Result, 42 AM.
JIRIS. PROOF FACTS 2d 405, §1 (1985) ("Under the doctrine of informed consent, it is well
established that ... a physician or surgeon must ... first obtain the consent of the patient ....
Going beyond the question of informed consent to treatment, this article covers whether and under what
circumstances a physician may be duty-bound to inform a patient ... of the physician's diagnosis
or of the results of the diagnostic test." (emphasis added)); id. at §2 ("[T]he courts have often
held that a physician was, or could be found to be, liable for malpractice for failing to inform a
patient or the subject of a medical examination of an unfavorable diagnosis or test result."); Amy
G. Gore, Eleanor L. Grossman, Lucas Martin & Karen B. Moulding, Duty to Notiey Patient of Result
oflDiagnosis or Test, 61 AM. JURIS. 21) PI IYSICIANS, SURGEONS, ETc. § 211 ("[T]he courts generally
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"malpractice liability based upon the physician's failure to inform his patient
of an unfavorable diagnosis or test is similar in many respects to these
'informed consent' cases," courts "[g]enerally ... recognize the existence of
a comparable duty of a physician to inform his patient, under ordinary
circumstances, of the diagnosis he has formed."66
Similarly, the duty to provide non-negligent medical care outside the
scope of informed consent liability surely includes some duties to disclose
general risk information that is not linked to medical decisions requiring
patient consent. For example, physicians may have a general duty to explain
to patients who smoke cigarettes that smoking dramatically increases the risk
of lung cancer, or to advise patients during the COVID-19 pandemic to wear
masks to protect themselves from infection. Of course, whether such a duty
in fact exists depends on whether it is within the standard of practice of
reasonably competent physicians; but a breach of that duty would surely be
treated as medical malpractice rather than an informed consent violation.
From my perspective, the disclosure duty Lens proposes-namely, the
duty to disclose to pregnant patients the risks of stillbirth and the factors that
can increase or decrease those risks-seems to fall squarely within the general
disclosure duties established by medical malpractice law. A breach of this duty
would deprive the pregnant person of important information needed make
decisions about how to reduce the risk of stillbirth-for example, side
sleeping, paying closer attention to fetal movement, and quitting smoking.6 7
However, these disclosures relate to general risk management during
pregnancy, rather than medical treatment provided by a physician that would
require affirmative consent.
The greatest challenge to the argument that a physician's failure to
disclose the risks of stillbirth should be viewed as traditional medical
malpractice is, of course, the fact that malpractice liability relies on a custombased standard of care. 68 When physicians are sued for malpractice, the
standard of care is defined as the customary standard of practice among
reasonable physicians practicing in that context; expert testimony is needed
to establish that standard, and fact-finders must generally defer to the expert's
conclusions. 69

recognize the existence of a duty of a physician to inform his or her patient, under ordinary
circumstances, of the diagnosis that he or she has formed," citing malpractice cases).
66. Shaw, Jr., supranote 43, at §2[a].
67.
Lens, supra note i, at 675-77.
68.
FURROw 1T71 Al., supra note 62, at 76-78 (discussing the standard of care in the context
of medical malpractice litigation).
69.
Id. at 77-78. The historical reliance on custom to set the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases is based in large part on the presumption that lay jurors lack the expertise and
technical knowledge required to understand what constitutes "reasonable care" in the context of
medical treatment. See Philip G. Peters,Jr., The Role of the Jwy in Modern MalpracticeLaw, 87 IOWA
L. Rvv. 909, 921 (2002) ("Many proponents of a custom-based standard of care doubt that lay
jurors have the technical expertise or intellectual ability to evaluate the conduct of skilled
professionals."); Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLITM. L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1942)
("When the defendant's craft is palpably esoteric, the courts require the plaintiff to prove by
experts that a feasible way of avoiding the plaintiff's injury was open to the defendant."). That
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However, Lens' article effectively demonstrates that disclosing risk
information about stillbirth is not currently part of the customary practice of
medicine. Indeed, it is the absence of such a practice that prompts Lens to
advocate for a new duty of disclosure. Thus, the fact that most physicians do
not customarily disclose information about the risk of stillbirth means that in
litigation, a fact-finder applying the custom-based standard would not
consider this to be a breach of the standard of care.
While deference to professional custom has long been the norm in
medical malpractice litigation, however, there are growing exceptions to that
rule. Several well-recognized cases have challenged the custom-based
standard, holding that a professional custom that is manifestly
unreasonable-or the absence of an established custom-will not shield a
health care provider from liability.7t) While some authors have argued that
these cases "represent[] a substantial departure from traditional medical
malpractice jurisprudence,"7' others suggest that there is substantial evidence
of a "slow but steady judicial abandonment of deference to medical custom"
beginning in the 197o's.72 A leading health law treatise further notes that
"[m] any jurisdictions are moving to a reasonable practice standardthat allows
the jury to consider evidence that a custom is no longer reasonable or
acceptable."7 A great deal of academic commentary has also developed on
this issue, with many legal scholars supporting the move away from a standard

said, in cases where "the subject matter of the allegedly substandard conduct is within the
common knowledge [and] fully comprehensible to ordinary non-medical members of the
public," courts recognize an exception to the requirement that an expert testify as to medical
custom. Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirementfor
Establishing the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 5 I, 52 (2007).

70.

See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding that defendant

ophthalmologists were negligent as a matter of law for failing to test plaintiff for glaucoma despite
uncontradicted expert testimony that it was the universal practice of ophthalmologists not to
administer glaucoma tests to patients under 40); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265,

271 (Wis. 1996), abrogatedby Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 3o

(Wis. 2001)

(in a medical malpractice case alleging negligent retinal surgery, holding that "[i]f what passes
for customary or usual care lags behind developments in medical science, such care might be

negligent, despite its customary nature.").
71.

Michelle M. Mello,

MalpracliceLiligwaion,149 U.

Of Swords and Shields: The Role of ClinicalPractice Guidelines in Medical
PENN. L. Rnv. 645, 659 (2001).

72.
Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 WAsi1. & Lvv L. REv. 163, 164 (2000) (also noting that "many of the states that

theoretically continue to defer to custom actually apply the custom-based standard of care in a
way that operates very much like a reasonable physician standard"). See also Anna B. Laakman,
When Should Physicians be Liable for Innovation?, 36 CAROZO L. REV. 913, 915 (2015) ("Medical
malpractice law is slowly shifting away from standards of care based on professional custom
toward a more free-form reasonableness test for assessing physician behavior."); cf. Alex Stein,
Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 120 1, 1226-29 (2012) (arguing that courts
have moved away from custom-based standards only in the context of decisions about resource
management, but that physicians are still "granted a near-unilateral power to determine
treatment-related" decisions, and citing Iellingas an example of the former).
73.

FURROW

ET Al,.,

supranote 62, at 78 (emphasis in original).
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that relies on the customary practice of medicine regardless of its efficacy or
reasonableness.7i
One concrete example of how courts have moved away from absolute
deference to professional custom can be found in the historical development
of the duty to secure informed consent. As noted in Part II, although
informed consent and medical malpractice are independent causes of action,
both are fundamentally grounded in principles of negligence law. Liability is
imposed only when a defendant breaches a duty of reasonable of care-in the
case of physicians, this may be a duty to make disclosures to a patient before
securing their consent, a duty to exercise due care in diagnosis or treatment,
or some other duty that is part of professional custom. However, when U.S.
courts first began to recognize a negligence-based cause of action for
informed consent in the 1960s and 1970s, professional custom did not
actually require disclosure of risk and benefit information before securing
patient consent to treatment.75 Indeed, it is precisely because courts
considered customary practice insufficient that they developed a new body of
common law establishing a duty of disclosure. 6
Thus, there is precedent to show that if a court believes that the
customary practice of the medical profession is unreasonable, deference to
expert testimony about professional custom may not be warranted. Indeed,
one of the main challenges to the custom-based standard is that it hinders
medical advancement and innovation.77 If liability were imposed any time
physicians deviated from what their colleagues customarily do, the medical
community would be disincentivized to develop new and more effective
treatments and practices.78 And if physicians were shielded from liability so
long as they complied with current practices-no matter how ineffective or
unreasonable those practices might be-medicine could not move forward.
Lens has amply demonstrated that physicians' failure to disclose risk
information about stillbirth to their pregnant patients may be the customary
practice, but one that is manifestly unreasonable. The burden of disclosing
this information is negligible as compared to the severity of the injury of
stillbirth-an injury might well be prevented if a patient knew of its risk factors
and the steps that could be taken to limit those risks. Consequently, there is a
strong argument to be made that if a medical malpractice case were brought
for non-disclosure of risk information about stillbirth, a judge or jury could
conclude that liability should be imposed despite the fact that physicians do

See, e.g., Peters, Jr., supra note 69, at 9 21;James A. Henderson,Jr. &John A. Siliciano,
74.
Universal Health Cate and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Delermining Medical Malproaice,
79 CORNELt. L. Rvv. 1382, 1400-04 (1994); Sandra H. Johnson, Customary Standard of Cate: A
Challengefir Regulation and Practice, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 9, 9-10 (2013).
Sawicki, sIpra note 32, at *22-24; BERG EIAI., supranote 3o, at 46-47.
75.
76.
As I have written elsewhere, "the law of informed consent developed because judges
made it so ... [c] ourts recognized a gap in patient protection and used tort law to fill that gap."
Sawicki, supra note 32, at *23-24.
77.

Laakman, supra note 72, at 916.

78.

Id. at 927.
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not customarily make such disclosures. Indeed, the powerful evidence Lens
presents in her article provides strong support for such a claim.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Medical Paternalism, Stillbirth, & Blindsided Mothers, Lens presents a
fierce and much-needed indictment of the paternalistic practice of not
disclosing risk information about stillbirth to pregnant patients. The
significance of this missing information-both in terms of opportunities for
preventing stillbirth and in rejecting the stigma and silence surrounding it
-cannot be overstated. The strength of the evidence Lens presents left me,
as a reader, convinced that the medical community's unwillingness to engage
in meaningful conversations about stillbirth with pregnant patients is
completely unjustified.
Lens proposes that this practice be considered a breach of physicians'
informed consent duties. However, in my opinion, this framing stretches the
boundaries of informed consent doctrine beyond what many courts may be
willing to accept. Thus, I offer this alternative framing for Lens' argument,
situating a physicians' failure to disclose the risk of stillbirth within the context
of simple medical malpractice. This proposal, too, stretches beyond
traditional doctrine, in that it would require a rejection of the custom-based
standard of care. However, given that medical malpractice law is already
moving away from its historical deference to professional custom, I expect
that courts may be more willing to accept this alternative framing.

